"PROPER PURPOSE" FOR INSPECTION OF
CORPORATE STOCK LEDGER
The current merger movement greatly exceeds in numbers and in
total assets any other such movement ever experienced in the United
States.' Controlling interests have been acquired by three primary
methods: proxy contests 2 public exchange offers, 3 and cash tender
offers.' Under each of these methods of corporate acquisition, the

acquiring corporation must correspond with individual stockholders
of the corporation to be acquired. Thus, access to the target
corporation's stocklist or stock ledger, which contains the names
and addresses of all record shareholders and the number of shares
held by each, is a normal prerequisite to obtaining control.
Under state corporate law a shareholder has a right to inspect
the corporate books and records, including the stocklist of his

corporation

Thus, a corporation seeking control of a publicly held

company need only acquire a few shares of the target's stock and
then demand access to the shareholder list." However, since the lists
are in the physical custody of the incumbent officers who have a
vested interest in the corporation's continued existence,' the lists are
I. Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 79, 80.
In 1968 there were 10 times as many mergers as in 1950; and in the last two years the
number has doubled. The total number in 1968 was over 4000. Id. Total mergers in 1969 rose
37 percent over 1968. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Jan. 6, 1970, at 45, col. 1.
2. Under this method, the corporation seeking control solicits proxies from the shareholders
of the target corporation. The proxy statement either calls for a merger or for the ouster of
the present directors of the target and the election of directors who support a merger. See
generallyStudebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
3. The acquiring corporation offers to exchange its stock for the stock of the shareholders
of the target corporation at a favorable rate. See Hearings on Problems in the Securities
Industry Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1969).
4. Such an offer normally consists of a bid by the acquiring corporation to the individual
shareholders of the target corporation to buy their shares in the company, usually at a figure
well above the market price.
Cash tender offers or takeover bids have become the primary means of obtaining control
of a corporation. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968). See also Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 BUs.
LAW. 611 (1968); Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F.
269 (1969).
5. All states recognize the existence of such a right. See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

§ 2213 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1967) [hereinafter cited as

FLETCHER].

6. See General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968);
Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969).
7. See Albrook, The Frustrationsof the Acquired Executive, FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 152.
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rarely given after a single request. 8 When the right to inspect is

refused, the requesting corporation must seek judicial enforcement.
Most of the recent litigation under these inspection statutes has
revolved around the propriety of the attempted inspection.
COMMON LAW AND EARLY STATUTORY INSPECTION RIGHTS

At common law a shareholder had a qualified right which
entitled him to inspect corporate books and records, including the
stock ledger, for a proper purpose in good faith at a proper time and

place.10 The right was based upon his beneficial ownership of the
corporate assets and the corresponding right to protect his interests
as a shareholder." If the shareholder making the inspection demand
had to go to the court, he had the burden of alleging and proving
2
that the purpose for the inspection was proper.

As a result of dissatisfaction over resistance by corporate officers
in allowing the right of inspection to minority shareholders, most
8. See Newman, Inspection of Stock Ledgers and Voting Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439, 440, 458
(1962).
9. When officers of a corporation deny a shareholder the right of access to the stocklist,
the remedy to enforce the right is mandamus. See notes 16-17 infra and accompanying text.
A state court is the forum for the action since the Federal Rules abolished the remedy of
mandamus. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b). But see Susquehanna Corp. v. General Refractories Co.,
250 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In a diversity case where the relief sought was enforcement
of a right to examine the books and records of a Pennsylvania corporation, the court held
that while under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964), mandamus could not be used
"except in aid of an applicable federal statute," the relief here requested was in the nature of
a mandatory injunction, permissible since the applicable state law provided a similar remedy.
The state law label of "mandamus" was held not to govern the federal characterization. See
also Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968). See generally 2 L. Loss,
SECURrrIES REGULATION 1001-06 (1961).
The enforcement of the inspection rights of shareholder lists has been the subject of more
litigation than any other individual right of the shareholder. See 2 G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 611 (1959).

10. E.g.,

Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); see H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS §§ 159-60 (rev. ed. 1946); 5 FLETCHER § 2214; 2 G. HORNSTEIN supra note

9, §§ 611-12.
11. See Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905); State ex rel. Boldt v. St. Cloud
Mill Producers' Ass'n,.200Minn. 1, 273 N.W. 603 (1937).
12. Courts have generally held that shareholders retain the common law right of inspection
unless specifically deprived of it by statute or by some authorized provision of the articles or
charter or by some duly authorized and valid by-law. See State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver
Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 A. 257 (1926); Ochs v. Washington Heights Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 17 N.Y.2d 82,215 N.E.2d 485,268 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1966); 5 FLETCHER § 2214, at 790.
13. N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS, & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES & MATERIALS 424 (4th
ed. 1968).
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states enacted, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, statutes
expressing the right of inspection by shareholders in unqualified
terms.14 Generally the courts found that such statutes vested the
shareholder with an absolute right to inspect the books regardless of
motive or purpose. 5 From the face of the state statutes, proper
purpose was not a condition of access; and the right of the

shareholder could not be denied by insiders even on the grounds of
improper or illegal purpose. However, despite the fact that the right
of inspection was absolute, the remedy which the shareholder sought,

a writ of mandamus, did not allow absolute enforcement. When the
shareholder who was denied this absolute inspection right sought

mandamus to compel its recognition, most courts concluded that the
extraordinary writ of mandamus had never been issued as a matter

of right but always in the court's discretion." Therefore, while the
right was an absolute one, the writ to enforce the right would not
be issued when the shareholder's motive or purpose was improper.

7

The development of Delaware law was similar to that of most
jurisdictions. The Delaware courts held that the unqualified language

of their state statute 8 had the effect of making the right of inspection
14. A good example is the early Delaware statute. "'The original or duplicate stock
ledger containing the names and addresses of the stockholders, and number of shares held
by them, respectively, shall, at all times, during the usual hours of business, be open to
the examination of every stockholder.
...Law of March 22, 1929, ch. 135, § 29 [1929]
Del. Laws 39 1.
15. E.g., Johnson v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624, 67 P. 1050 (1902); Venner v. Chicago City
Ry., 246 I1.170, 92 N.E. 643 (1910); Henry v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 196 N.Y. 302, 89
N.E. 942 (1909); State ex rel. Dempsey v. Werra Aluminum Foundry Co., 173 Wis. 651, 182
N.W. 354 (1921). In discussing New York's statute, Law of May 7, 1897, ch. 384, § 53,
[1897] N.Y. Laws 314, which was a model for many other states, the New York Court of
Appeals noted that
. . . the Legislature could make the stockholder's privilege of inspection dependent
upon the motive or purpose with which it is sought; but it has not seen fit to do so.
The language of the statute is plain and mandatory. It recognizes an absolute right in
the stockholder and imposes an absolute duty upon the corporation and the custodian
of the stock book. The law requires no statement or proof of any particular intent upon
the part of the person demanding the inspection. Henry v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 196
N.Y. 302, 305, 89 N.E. 942, 943 (1909).
16. See note 9 supra.
17. E.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905); State ex rel. Costelo v. Middlesex
Banking Co., 87 Conn. 483, 88 A. 861 (1913); Shea v. Sweetser, 119 Me. 400, 111 A. 579
(1920); Bruning v. Hoboken Printing and Publishing Co., 67 N.J.L. 119, 50 A. 907 (Sup. Ct.
1902). But see Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 246 I11.
170, 92 N.E. 643 (1910); State ex rel.
Dempsey v. Werra Aluminum Foundry Co., 173 Wis. 651, 182 N.W. 354 (1921) (inspection
statutes gave the shareholder an absolute right, and consequently no discretion existed with
the court to deny a writ of mandamus).
18. See note 14 supra.
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by a shareholder absolute. Despite the absolute language of the
statute, however, it was not meant to remove the courts' discretion
in mandamus, and, accordingly, the writ should be issued only for
a proper purpose."9 The statute did affect the procedure for obtaining
mandamus. Under common law the writ was issued only after an
affirmative pleading of proper purpose; however, since the statute was
absolute in its terms creating the right, the shareholder seeking
inspection no longer had to allege proper purpose in his writ, but,
instead, the burden shifted to the corporation of alleging improper
purpose or motive in its return."0 Unfortunately, the situation was
complicated by the rules that in mandamus the allegations in the
writ which were not denied in the return were taken as true' and that
the answer to the writ was conclusive and was presumed to be true. 2
Thus, if it were averred in the return to the writ that the purpose of
the shareholder in seeking inspection was improper, the answer had
to be considered true and the writ denied2 3 The courts reasoned that
since mandamus was a summary writ, there was no procedure
whereby the merits of the issues raised could be determined 2 ' The
result was that the shareholder's statutory, absolute right of access
to the corporate books and records could be defeated by a mere
allegation of improper purpose. Responding to ihis situation, the
legislature enacted an amendment to the mandamus procedure which
provided that upon the filing of an application for the writ by the
relator and the return by the defendant, any question of fact which
19. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 A. 257 (1926); State ex
rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922); State ex rel Linihan v. United
Brokerage Co., 29 Del. 570, 101 A. 433 (Super. Ct. 1917); Mercantile Trading Co. v.
Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 154 A. 457 (Ch. 1931).
20. See. e.g., State ex rel.
Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922).
21. Bay State Gas Co. v. State exrel. H. Content & Co., 20 Del. 238, 56 A. 1114 (1902).
22. State ex rel.
Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773, 774 (1922); McCoy v.
State ex rel. Allee, 16 Del. 543, 36 A. 81 (1897);" State ex rel. National Bank v. Jessup &

Moore Paper Co., 27 Del. 248, 88 A. 449 (Super. Ct. 1913).
The Delaware Supreme Court noted:

The return to the alternative writ, if it does not show a compliance with the mandate
of the writ, must set forth either a positive denial of the truth of the allegations
contained in the writ, or state other facts sufficient in law to defeat the relator's right
... .In the State of Delaware the common law rule prevails that the return of the
alternative writ is conclusive and is to be taken as true for the purpose of the case.
State ex rel.
Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 24 Del. 379, 385-86, 77 A. 16, 19
(1910), quoting WOOLLEY, DELAWARE PRACTICE § 1662.
23. See cases citectnote 22 supra.
24. State ex rel.
Linihan v. United Brokerage Co., 29 Del. 570, 581, 101 A. 433, 437 (Super.
Ct. 1917); see note 22supra.
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should arise would be heard and determined by the superior court2 5
In this manner the superior court was vested with the power to look

to the facts to ascertain the propriety of an inspection-demand! 6
"PROPER

PURPOSE"

AS AN ELEMENT OF MODERN INSPECTION
STATUTES

Modern inspection statutes have moved away from the absolute
language of the early statutes and expressly condition the right of
inspection upon a showing of at least a "proper purpose." Some of

the state statutes, as interpreted, provide for two classes of
shareholders, who are treated differently for the purposes of deciding
which party has the burden of establishing the propriety or

impropriety of the inspection.2 7 If the shareholder making the
demand is a record holder of stock for a certain amount of time or

holds a certain percentage of the outstanding stock, then once he
alleges a proper purpose, the burden shifts to the corporation to

establish that an improper purpose is really present. If the
shareholder does not meet either the percentage or time requirement,

then his burden remains as it was under the common law of,
inspection, 28 and he must establish the propriety of his purpose.29
Such restrictions appear to be aimed at assuring "that a legitimate

purpose related to the shareholder's interest in his capacity as a
shareholder is present.

The purpose for the inspection of corporate records, including
stocklists, is, therefore, the decisive factor in determining whether the

inspection will be granted to a shareholder. Early English common
law required that there be a particular controversy or dispute before
the right of inspection would be granted, and then it was only

granted for the purposes of that-particular dispute

°

Most American

25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 564 (1953).

26. For an application of the amended statute, see State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34
Del. 538, 156 A. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931).
27. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624 (McKinney 1963); ORE. REV. STAT- § 57.246
(1953). The Model Act, on which many recent state corporations acts have been based,
requires that in order to inspect, the shareholder must have -been of record for at least six
months immediately preceding his demand or be a holder .of record of at least 5 percent of
all the outstanding shares of the corporation. Under the Model Act, the burden is on the
requesting party to state the purpose for which it is requested, and it must be for a "proper
purpose" at a reasonable time. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT.§ 46 (1960).
28. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
29. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 46 (1960). See generally Rosentool v. Bonanza
Oil & Mine Corp., 221 Ore. 520, 352 P.2d 138 (1960).
30. King v. Master & Wardens of Merchant Tailor's Co., 2 Bar. & Ad. 114, 109 Eng. Rep.
1086 (K.B. 1831); Regina v. Saddlers' Co., 10 Week. Rptr. 87 (C.P. 1861).
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courts have never held that a dispute need be shown but instead have
looked to the interests of all the shareholders, rather than to those

of just the demandant. t Generally the courts have found that it is a
proper purpose to gain access to a shareholder list for
communication with other shareholders concerning corporate
business. Particular types of communication for which inspection
has been granted are: solicitation of proxies or influencing voting in
anticipation of a shareholders' meeting; 31 solicitation of shareholders
to join in a derivative suit,e dissemination of information concerning
a proposed merger; 4 formation of a protective committee of
preferred shareholders;35 and solicitation to buy shares of the
company's stock from other shareholders 6 Purposes which have
been found to be improper include curiosity, 3 harassment, 38 and the
sale of shareholders' lists as a business.3 9 Furthermore,
31. See Fulle v. White Metal Mfg. Co., 13 N.J. Misc. 591, 180 A. 231 (Sup. Ct.
1935): "'[I]nspection of the books of'a corporation . . . will be ordered only when 'a case
is presented which indicates not only a bona fide desire to safeguard the interests of
all stockholders but a probability that the interests of all will be served by the proposed
investigation.' "Id. at 592, 180 A. at 231 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
32. A shareholder may contact other shareholders regarding a corporate meeting for the
election of directors, seek proxies to change the management, discuss a suit against directors
for mismanagement, enlist aid in enjoining a proposed sale of corporate assets, solicit proxies
favoring the election of a new management opposed to or in favor of a proposed merger,
discuss a plan of recapitalization, enlist support in enforcing the shareholders' right to
dividends, or solicit proxies for the purpose of gaining control of the upcoming meeting. 5
FLETrCHR § 2223.
33. State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 41 Del. 172, 18 A.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1941).
34. Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955).
35. Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950).
36. E.L. Bruce Co. v. State ex rel. Gilbert, 51 Del. 252, 144 A.2d 533 (1958); Florida Tel.
Corp. v. State ex rel. Peninsular Tel. Co., 111 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1959); Crouse v. Rogers Park
Apt., 343 Ill. App. 319, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951). But see Laidlaw & Co. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 52
Misc. 2d 122, 275 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The Laidlaw court held that a solicitation
for sale of stock would not benefit either the company or the shareholders and therefore denied
inspection. This decision has been criticized for adopting too narrow a view of "benefit." See
Weeks, Business Associations, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 353, 354-55 (1968). In his criticism, the
author states that the court mistkenly concluded that personal gain and corporate benefit
were never the same, a conclusion which would be contrary to the very basis on which most
businesses are founded.The author viewed proper purpose as being shown by an argument that
better management might result from the acquired shares. In any event, the denial to
inspection in such c ase might be more disruptive to corporate life than the alternative of a
proxy contest. Id. at 355.
37. 5 FLETCHER § 2226.1.
38. Id. § 2226.4.
39. See General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 533, 240 A.2d 755, 756 (Sup.
Ct. 1968); State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922); Eaton v.
Manter, 114 Me. 259,95 A. 948 (1915).
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commentators and court dicta express the view that courts should
refuse to enforce the right of inspection where the purpose involves

an unlawful scheme of the demandant. 40
Courts for the most part have purported to view all the facts and
circumstances to see if the demand of the shareholder seeking

inspection was made in good faith or whether there was an ulterior

purpose behind the demand. 4 However, even if there is a strong

possibility that the shareholder may use the list for an improper

purpose, such as for commercial reasons, 42 inspection will be granted
if an otherwise proper purpose has been established.43 Nor is the fact

that a shareholder is a business competitor or in control of a
competing corporation a defense to inspection if an otherwise proper

purpose is shown."
Recent Delaware decisions have allowed inspection of the stock

ledger by a shareholder for purposes which were alleged by the
defendant corporation to be in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy.
The new Delaware statute requires only that a proper purpose be
alleged by the demandant and defines such purpose as one

reasonably related to the shareholder's interest as a stockholder. 45 It
also places the burden of proof on the corporate officers to establish
that the inspection is really for an improper purpose."5 The Delaware

courts appear to be refusing to go behind the pleadings to determine
if there is an improper purpose motivating the request for inspection.
40. E.g., State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 520, 115 A. 773, 776 (1922);
Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 111.228, 235, 52 N.E.2d 769, 771 (1944); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d
11(1951).
41. See Newman, supra note 8, at 459.
42. See cases cited note 39 supra.
43. Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955)
(inspection granted to a securities dealer); Morris v. United Piece Dye Works, 137 N.J.L. 262,
59 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Bundy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 38 Ohio Op. 77, 75 N.E.2d
717 (Ct. App. 1947).
44. E.L. Bruce Co. v. State ex rel. Gilbert, 51 Del. 252, 144 A.2d 533 (1958); Mayer v.
Cincinnati Economy Drug Store, 89 Ohio App. 512, 103 N.E.2d 1 (1951).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1968) provides that "[a]ny stockholder. . . shall
upon written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right . . . to inspect
for any proper purpose the corporation's stock ledger . . . . A proper purpose shall mean a
purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder."
The statute does not require a minimum amount of time for which the shareholder must
be a record holder, nor is there a requirement that the demandant be a record owner of a
certain percentage of stock in order to exercise the right of inspection. Compare text
accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (Supp. 1968). The burden is on the shareholder
seeking inspection to establish his proper purpose for inspection of corporate books and
records other than its stocklist. Id.
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4 7 a record
In General Time, Corp. v. Talley Industries,

shareholder of General Time, Talley Industries, on being denied
access to General Time's stock ledger by its officers, instituted suit
under the Delaware statute. The stated purpose for the inspection
was the solicitation of proxies to be used to oust the management
of General Time.4 8 Suspecting that Talley's purpose for the
inspection was a preliminary step in a move to acquire control of
General Time, the General Time directors sought to defeat the right
of access to its shareholder list by establishing that although the
stated purpose of Talley was proper, it had other purposes which
were improper and illegal. In order to establish violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193441 and the Investment Company Act
of 1940,50 General Time sought to have the president of Talley
answer questions directed at proving that Talley had purchased its
shares of General Time and sought to acquire control of General
Time by unlawful means51 The Talley president refused to answer
the questions on the grounds that they were not directed to the
primary purpose for which the list was desired, the solicitation of
proxies to oust General-Time's management. The Delaware Supreme
Court-sustained the president's refusal to answer stating that it
would not look at the facts to see if Talley had a further improper
purpose abetted by illegal action. The court stated that any
secondary purpose in seeking the list was totally irrelevant once the
shareholder had established that he was a record shareholder and his
primary purpose was reasonably related to that status.52
Even though it has been generally held by courts and
commentators that inspection will not be granted for illegal
purposes, 3 the General Time court adopted a reasonable view in
allowing inspection even though it was alleged by the defense that
Talley had violated federal securities laws. At the time of the state
47.
48.
49.
50.

43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Id. at 532, 240 A.2d at 756.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78p(a) (1964).
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13, 80a-17 (1964).

51. The questions asked of Talley's president were: (1) what other persons or entities,
known to the officers of Talley Industries, owned stock in General Time; (2) whether the funds
with which Talley Industries purchased General Time stock were borrowed; and (3) whether
Talley Industries wanted a merger with General Time, and, if so, when was the idea first
conceived. 43 Del. Ch. at 532-33, 240 A.2d at 756.

52. 43 Del. Ch. at 533, 240 A.2d at 756.
53. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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court action to gain access to General Time's stocklist, a General
Time action was pending against Talley in a United States District
Court in New York5 which charged Talley with the same violations
of the Securities Exchange Act and Investment Company Act that
General Time attempted to use as a defense to Talley's right of

inspection. It had been held in Delaware that a state court should
not adjudicate issues arising under the Securities Exchange Act and
the associated regulations. 55 Therefore, if the Delaware court had
refused inspection simply because of alleged illegal action which
could not be adjudicated on the merits in its courts, the shareholder's

right of inspection would hiave been defeated by the mere allegation
of a federal securities law violation even though the federal court

adjudication might later exonerate the demandant. 5 s Clearly such a
result was not intended by the legislature when "proper purpose"

was codified in the Delaware corporate statute. 57 The alleged
54. 43 Del. Ch. at 533 n.*, 240 A.2d at 756 n.*. See note 56 infra.
55. American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (Sup.
Ct. 1957); Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 606, 51
A.2d 572, 579 (Sup. Ct. 1947). These decisions were based upon section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 calling for exclusive jurisdiction in federal tribunals. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964). See 3 L. Loss, supra note 9, at 2005.
56. When Talley's alleged violations of federal securities law were finally litigated in the
federal courts, it was found that there had been no violation of, the 1934 Act for false or
misleading statements in proxy materials. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). But a violation was found of section 17(d)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8a-17(d) (1964), which was enacted
to protect the shareholders of underwriters. SEC v. Talley Indus., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969). However despite the violation, there was no reason to
declare void the election at the shareholders' meeting of General Time where a slate nominated
by Talley had won election, since the election had no detrimental effect upn the underwriter's
shareholders. SEC v. General Time Corp., 407 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1026 (1969). Thus if the Delaware court had not allowed inspection, a statutory right would
have been denied even though the claim of an improper, illegal purpose adversely affecting
the interests of shareholders could liot be sustained. The situation would be similar to that
which existed when the Delaware courts would not look to the substance of a return to a writ
of mandamus and would disallow inspection on a mere allegation of improper purpose. See
text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
57. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. Blot, 267 F. Supp. 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Plaintiff corporation
in a federal forum asserted that the defendant had acquired shares of the corporation stock
in transactions which violated § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act and rule lOb-5. It asked
for an injunction against defendant "using or relying" on any such shares "for the purpose
of compelling the disclosure of the stock records of plaintiff corporation in a proceeding in a
New York state court." In allowing inspection, the court stated that even if his purchase
violated the Act it "seems unnecessarily drastic and potentially unsettling for the securities
markets and corporate affairs" not to allow inspection under a state created right. 267 F.
Supp. at 958 (citing Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the SEC at p. 10).
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violation of federal securities law is collateral to the inspection
proceeding and was correctly viewed as such by the Delaware court."8
There are other forums avaiiable to adjudicate the alleged violations
and other remedies if the alleged violations were found to exist which
would fully safeguard those interests which the federal statutes were
designed to protect5
In Northwest Industries v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,6" the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld Northwest's refusal to allow Goodrich access
to its stocklist. The court's rationale was not that Goodrich's
purpose was improper but that the request for inspection was not
specific enough on its face. Four days after acquiring shares in
Northwest, Goodrich sought access to Northwest's stocklist for the
stated purpose of enabling Goodrich "to communicate with the
[Northwest] stockholders . . . with reference to a special meeting of
the stockholders of the company. "61 The request was denied by
Northwest on the grounds that the actual purpose was to block an
impending takeover by Northwest and keep its incumbent
management in office. The chancery court, relying on General Tine,
granted inspection holding that to communicate with stockholders
was a "proper purpose," and therefore the existence of a secondary
purpose was irrelevant.62 Without viewing the propriety of the
purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that
Goodrich in its demand for inspection did not state the substance
58. Cf.Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Porterie, 54 Del. 582, 183 A.2d 174
(1962). See also State ex rel. Armour & Co. v. Gulf Sulphur Corp., 233 A.2d 457 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1967).
59. If in such a federal court proceeding it was found that the allegations were true, the
court could enjoin demandant from soliciting proxies or taking any other action which the
court might deem to be in furtherance of the illegal conspiracy. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra
note 9, at 931-73.
See also SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), holding that the merger of two
insurance companies, allegedly accomplished through false and misleading proxy statements,
could be challenged under the anti-fraud provision of § 10(b) of the Securities ExchangeAct
and rule lOb-5; Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F. 2d 937, 946
(2d Cir. 1969), allowing a target corporation standing to seek judicial relief for alleged
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by an acquiring corporation in a cash
tender offer, thereby allowing management to fight a tender offer with stockholders' money.
If a proxy statement fails to disclose intent to liquidate assets after the merger and the extent
to which liquidation value exceeded the going-concern value, then it is in violation of the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, and a minority stockholder can bring the
action. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
60. 260 A.2d 428 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 429; see Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969).
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of its intended communication in a manner sufficient to enable
Northwest or the courts to determine whether there was a reasonable

relationship between its purpose and Goodrich's interest as a
shareholder.63 The court reasoned that it would be "difficult, if not
impossible" for Goodrich to show such a relationship within so few
days after acquiring its stock in Northwest.64
The chief justice dissented 5 concluding that the Delaware

inspection statute "gives a practically absolute right of inspection"66
and that to "communicate with his fellow stockholders" is a
purpose germane to the status of a shareholder. He felt that the
length of time Goodrich held its stock before making the demand
was immaterial.

Despite the fact that the purpose for which

Goodrich

sought inspection was apparent to both the defehdant corporation

and the court,67 the supreme court's emphasis on the substance of
the demand is justifiable if it is viewed only as instructing the

Delaware bar on the proper form in which a demand for inspection

68
should be made under the new corporation statute.

As for the supreme court's dicta concerning the obvious
difficulty of establishing a proper purpose in such a short time
lapse,6 9 the court appears to have misread the legislative intent

behind the inspection provision. The Delaware legislature
63. 260 A.2d at 429.
64. Id.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. But cf.The Wall St. Journal, Feb. 4, 1969, at 2, cols. 2-3.
In another development yesterday, Goodrich announced that "as a stockholder of
Northwest" it is asking for a list of holders so it can communicate with them "with
reference to a special stockholders meeting." A Goodrich spokesman declined to say
how much Northwest stock Goodrich owns or precisely why the company wants the
list. This left it unclear whether Goodrich would seek to call a Northwest stockholder
meeting itself or was referring to a special meeting Northwest has said it will call to
vote on a 3-for-I stock split and additional shares to implement the offer for Goodrich.
Id. (emphasis added).
68. Before the 1967 enactment, the Delaware inspection statute did not on its face require
an allegation of a proper purpose in order to gain access to the stocklist. See note 14 supra.
The chancellor in Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855, 857-58 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(discussed infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text), commented upon the need to be able to
dispose of a case simply by viewing the affidavit: "[the inspection provision] contemplates
summary proceedings and the accelerated scheduling of cases under it emphasizes prompt
processing and disposition . . . .Administration of the statute will present special difficulties
if the 'purpose' clause permits open-end litigation."
69. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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deliberately chose not to include a time period which must elapse in
order for a shareholder to demand inspection, despite the fact that
the Model Act,70 which the legislature used as the basic framework
of their corporate act, 7' contained such a provision. Although the
first four drafts of the proposed inspection statute by the Delaware
Corporate Law Revision Committee called for the burden of proof
to be entirely upon the shareholder in establishing a proper
purpose, 72 the statutory language as finally enacted clearly shows
that the legislature intended to place the burden of proof upon the
resisting corporation to establish that the inspection of the stock
ledger was for an improper purpose once the shareholder has
complied with the provisions of the statute respecting the form and
3
manner of making the demand
Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp.,4 demonstrates how inspection of
another corporation's stocklist can be used for broad defensive, as
well as offensive, purposes in battles over corporate acquisitions and
control. In order to acquire control of Heli-Coil, Mite wanted to
solicit offers from other Heli-Coil shareholders to exchange their
stock for Mite stock. A day after becoming the registered owner of
100 Heli-Coil shares, Mite demanded access to Heli-Coil's stock
ledger and stocklist. Heli-Coil countered by acquiring 100 shares of
Mite and nine days later making a similar demand for inspection of
the stocklist of Mite. Each corporation resisted the other's demand,
resulting in an action being brought in the chancery court to compel
inspection. The chancellor held that each corporation could examine
the stocklist of the other 5
70. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 46 (1960).
71. See Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive

Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75 (1967); Canby, Delaware's New Corporation Law, 39 PA. B.
Ass'N Q. 380 (1968); Note, The New Delaware Corporation Law, 5 HARV. J. LEGis. 413

(1968).
72. See Delaware General Corporation Law (draft no. 4, May 6, 1965).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1968). It is also interesting to note that the fact
that General Time made its demand for access to the list the same day it became a record
stockholder was not even mentioned by the supreme court as being relevant in its opinion in
General Time. See Memorandum in Opposition to Application for an Order Compelling
Inspection, Talley Indus. v. General Time Corp., No. 34 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1968). See also
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Porterie, 54 Del. 582, 183 A.2d 174 (1962), granting
inspection to a record owner of stock even though he had purchased the stock 13 days before
the demand for the sole purpose of communicating with the other stockholders about a pending

suit.
74. 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969).

75. Id.
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Mite's avowed purpose for demanding access to the stocklist was

to communicate with other shareholders of Heli-Coil in order to
solicit offers to exchange their stock for stock of Mite.76 Relying on

an earlier Delaware decision, 7 the chancellor found this to be a
proper purpose. He viewed as irrelevant the fact that Mite's shares

in Heli-Coil allegedly had not been registered under federal securities

law78 and that Mite had admittedly acquired the 100 Heli-Coil shares
solely to enable it to demand inspection of Heli-Coil's stocklist for

the purpose of acquiring control of the corporation

9

The chancellor

stated that, if the purpose is proper, "[iut is not made improper

because the first shares were purchased as a prelude to a demand of
the list" s or because Mite may have violated some federal law in

acquiring the stock!' The sole determining factors were that Mite
was a record holder of Heli-Coil stock and that inspection of the

stocklist was demanded for a proper purpose.
As for the Heli-Coil counterclaim, the shareholder's stated
purpose was communication with other shareholders of Mite in

"connection with the Exchange Offer to be submitted for approval
at a special meeting of Mite Corporation stockholders ....

Since he viewed this purpose as proper, the chancellor did not
consider the substance of Mite's defense but simply held that it was

irrelevant that Heli-Coil's real purpose in demanding access to
Mite's stocklist may have been to frustrate Mite's takeover bid,
although apparently viewing such a purpose as improper. The
76. Id. at 856.
77. E.L. Bruce Co. v. State ex rel:
Gilbert, 51 Del. 257, 144 A.2d 533 (1958).
78. 256 A.2d at 856,.citing Kerkorian v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 253 A.2d 221 (Del. Ch.),
affd 254 A.2d 240 (Del. 1969) and General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 43 Del. 531, 240
A.2d 755 (1968). This holding was proper since it could not be determined by the chancellor
whether a violation of federal securities law did in fact occur. See notes 55-59 supra and
accompanying text.
79. 256 A.2d at 856. Desiring to acquire control should not be viewed as an improper
purpose. See note 36 supra. In Florida Tel. Corp. v. State ex rel. Peninsular Tel. Co., I ll
So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1959), the court quite properly pointed out that "protection of [the
shareholder's] interest by purchasing additional stock is a perfectly legitimate enterprise ....
The desire to gain control is repugnant only to those seeking its retention .
I..."
Id. at 681
(emphasis added). It may well be in the best interest of the shareholders to have new
management, since takeover bids are usually preceded by "mismanagement." See note 98
infra'. The court in Laidlaw & Co. v. Pacific Ins. Co., 52 Misc. 2d 122, 275 N.Y.S.2d 125
(Sup. Ct. 1966), apparently lost sight of the purpose of inspection statutes when it found that
gaining control of a corporation was an "improper" purpose. See note 36 supra.
80. 256 A.2d at 856.
81. Id. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
82. 256 A.2d at 857.
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chancellor reasoned that once a proper purpose for the inspection of
the stock records was established, then all other alleged purposes,
whether primary or secondary, were irrelevantY
In reaching its decision in Mite, the chancellor properly ignored
the dicta in Northwest Industries concerning the amount of time a
demandant must hold its stock, since the legislature clearly did not
intend such a requirement.' He found instead that there was enough
substance on the face of both demands to show a reasonable
relationship between the purpose and an interest as a shareholder.
Both Mite and Heli-Coil stated the purpose of the desired
communication with the other shareholders, not merely the 85desire to
communicate as Goodrich had done in Northwest Industries.
Although the holding in Mite allowing both corporations the
right of inspection appears sound, the chancellor based his decision
upon an erroneous interpretation of the statute. The chancellor
seems to have overlooked the theory behind the right of inspection.
Inspection statutes are designed primarily to protect the interests of
the shareholders and to keep them informed of corporate activity
which may affect them.8 Inspection should not be granted if the
shareholders' interests obviously would be hurt by the inspection
even if a proper purpose appears on the face of the demand.
Although the chancery should accept a presumption that the stated
purpose for the inspection is the primary or real purpose, it should
be willing to hear evidence that it is not. For example, if the stated
purpose for the demand is to communicate with other shareholders
concerning the ousting of the present directors for allegedly illegal
action, the court might accept the presumption that such purpose,
being proper, is the real purpose for inspection. However, if the
corporation attempting to defeat the inspection is able to show that
a similar request has been made 20 times in the previous two months
by the same disgruntled shareholder, then the court should exercise
its discretionary equitable powers and look to the substance of the
defense that the real and primary purpose is harassment and refuse
the right of inspection. 7 The same result would follow if the
corporation can establish that the primary purpose of inspection is
83. Id. at 858.
84. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
85. Compare text accompanying note 82 supra with text accompanying note 61 supra.
86. See generally H. BALLANTINE, supra note 10, §§ 159-60; 5 FLETCHER §§ 2213, 2215;
2 G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 9, §§ 611-12 (1959).
87. Cf. State ex rel. Linihan v. United Brokerage Co., 29 Del. 570, 101 A. 433 (1917).
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to aid a competitor or to sell the list. This rationale would also be
consistent with the holding in General Time since the D.elaware
courts are unable to consider evidence dealing with the truthfulness
of alleged violations of federal securities law which would probably
preclude the defendants from introducing evidence on this point.88
The chancellor in Mite, however, was of the view that inspection
should be granted if the demandant merely makes an allegation of
proper purpose. If inspection is granted solely on such an allegation,
then the court is in effect making the right of inspection an absolute
one, since a proper purpose can seemingly always be alleged by a
demanding party. It appears clearly contrary to legislative intent to
allow such a practice since the drafters stated that inspection was to
be granted for a "proper purpose." It would indeed be ironic if
under Delaware's new corporation statute requiring "proper
purpose," an absolute right of inspection resulted, while under the
former Delaware statute, which on its face gave an absolute right,"
the right was conditional upon a proper purpose which was
determined by the court looking behind the pleadings."0
Although the chancellor indicated in dicta that Heli-Coil's
primary purpose of frustrating Mite's takeover bid might be an
improper one," he nevertheless granted inspection since a proper
purpose was alleged on the face of the demand by Heli-Coil. Even
if the primary purpose of Heli-Coil's communication with Mite's
shareholders was to frustrate Mite's takeover bid, such a purpose
should not be viewed as an improper one. In determining the
propriety of purpose, the court should consider the basic rationale
and justification for inspection statutes. As previously noted, the
2
purpose of the statutes is to provide for well-informed shareholders
Since the shareholders of Mite must make the determination of
whether a merger with Heli-Coil is desirable ,83 Heli-Coil's
communication to them concerning the value of the merger would
be in their best interests since a view would be expressed which would
point out the disadvantages of such a merger-views that the Mite
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
See note 14supra.
See text accompanying notes 18-26 supra.
256 A.2d at 857-58.
See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
All jurisdictions require that a plan of merger be approved by the shareholders. 2
FLETCHER § 544 n.55. See also 15 id. chs. 61-62.
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directors would have no incentive to elucidate. 4 To prevent a target
corporation from obtaining the shareholder list of the aggressor in
order to effectively present its position is not in harmony with the
right of shareholders to be appraised of the positions of competing
groups. 5 Therefore, the attempt to foil a takeover bid by presenting
unfavorable aspects of the proposed merger should be viewed as a
proper purpose to obtain shareholder lists.
Inspection should be allowed by a shareholder wishing to
communicate with other shareholders concerning a possible takeover
since the protection the shareholder needs against misleading
statements resulting from such communication is provided by other
means. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its new Williams
Amendment" requires that the shareholders be given the facts from
which to make a determination on the merits of a merger by
providing for full, fair, and complete disclosure of the pertinent facts
in connection with a tender offer, or a request or invitation for
tender, or proxy, or any other solicitations of security holders, If a
corporation is attempting a takeover, it is required to issue a
statement which describes any plans or proposals to liquidate the
target of the takeover, or merger of it into another, or to sell its
assets to another corporation, or to make any other major changes
in its business or corporate structure. 7 Thus, the shareholder is
presented accurate information from which he personally is able to
determine his course of action concerning his shares after viewing the
94. Creating conglomerates tends to increase stock prices long before it increases the
economic values on which those prices ultimately depend. In 1967 the average aggressor

corporation paid 18 times earnings for the average target, and in 1968, 27 times earnings.
Burck, supra note 1, at 80.

95. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Porterie, 54 Del. 582, 586, 183 A.2d 174,
176 (1962); Murchison v. Alleghany Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 290, 297, 210 N.Y.S.2d 153, 160
(Sup. Ct. 1960), af/d 12 App. Div. 2d 753,210 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1961).

96. A proxy fight is subject to the regulations promulgated by the SEC under section 14
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (Supp. IV, 1969).
A public exchange offer requires registration of the offered security under the Securities Act
of 1933 and advance filing of a prospectus which subsequently must be given to persons being
requested to tender their shares for exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1964).
Regulation of cash tender offers (the "Williams Amendment") came under sections 13 and
14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969). See Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).

The fact that these provisions are limited to securities that are registered under the Exchange
Act may encourage companies that expect to be the target of a takeover to voluntarily register
their securities under the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (Supp. IV, 1969).

97. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(c); see S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967); H.R.
REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 273-74, 278-85.
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facts on both sides. Due to the major consequences which a merger
could produce, this decision is one which the shareholder should
make, and not the officers of his corporation by attempting to make
it impossible for the corporation seeking to gain control to contact
the target corporation's shareholders. 8
An increased concentration of corporate assets and business
power is believed by some to be a development against which policy
instruments should be brought to bear. 9 However, if that is one's
inclination, then it should be done by legislation aimed at dealing
with the conglomerate merger rather than by judicial construction
of the shareholder inspection statutes to prevent takeover bids as
some courts have done."'0 Such construction is inconsistent with
these statutes' purpose to insure free disclosure for the protection of
the shareholder interests. This protection is not afforded by rejecting
a request for inspection on the grounds that it is designed to aid in
a corporate takeover which may in fact prove beneficial to the
corporation, nor is it afforded by refusing to investigate allegations
of possibly harmful motives on the basis that "if a plaintiff
established a proper purpose then all others are irrelevant."''
98. Studies have concluded that takeover bids have often been invited by mismanagement
of the target company. D. AUSTIN, PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE REFORM (Bureau of
Business Research, U. Mich., Mich. Bus. Rep. No. 47 (1965)); Taussig & Hayes, Are Cash
ANALYST J., Jan.-Feb. 1967 at 107, 108-09.
99. Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate

Take-Over Bids Unethical?FINANCIAL

Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 817-30 (1965). Attorney General
Mitchell stated that "never has there been a more urgent need for vigorous enforcement of

our antitrust laws," The Wall St. Journal, Mar. 28, 1969, at 4, cols. 1-2, because "I believe
that the future vitality of our free economy may be in danger because of the increasing threat

of economic concentration by corporate mergers." VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, July 15,
1969, at 592-93; Richard McLaren, the head of the Antitrust Division, feels the need to stop
the "current accelerated trend towards concentration by merger and . . . the severe economic
and social dislocations attendant thereon." Bus. WEEK, Mar. 15, 1969, at 38. See also Burck,
supra note 1, at 79.
100. See note 79 supra.
101. Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855, 858 (Del. Ch. 1969).

